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Abstract: Nowadays bank insolvency is a specific field in bank capi-
tal management, which requires constant development of the existing regula-
tions and application of new methods and tools for its prevention and early 
detection. The paper presents a study on bank insolvency in terms of regulato-
ry challenges and empirical evidence for initiation of bankruptcy proceedings 
against credit institutions. The research thesis is that bank insolvency is a cri-
sis phenomenon in banking practice whose theoretical modelling, regulatory 
management and empirical investigation require constant improvement of the 
regulatory framework and supervisory bodies of the central banking institu-
tion. The aim of the study was to perform a critical analysis of the evolution 
of the regulatory framework related to bank insolvency management using 
empirical evidence from the banking practice in Bulgaria.  
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ank insolvency is a specific field in bank capital management, which 
requires constant development of the existing regulations and applica-
tion of new methods and tools for its prevention and early detection. 
This paper presents a study on bank insolvency in terms of regulatory chal-
lenges and empirical evidence for initiation of bankruptcy proceedings against 
credit institutions.  
The research thesis is that bank insolvency is a crisis phenomenon in 
banking practice whose theoretical modelling, regulatory management and 
empirical investigation require constant improvement of the regulatory 
framework and supervisory bodies of the central banking institution. The aim 
                                           
1 Е-mail: kristimarinova@abv.bg 
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of the study was to perform a critical analysis of the evolution of the regulato-
ry framework related to bank insolvency management using empirical evi-
dence from the banking practice in Bulgaria. 
The paper comprises three sections. In the first section we discuss the 
relationship between the banking system and bank insolvency. Section two 
reviews the response mechanisms in cases of bank insolvency, illiquidity, and 
bankruptcy. The third section focuses on the empirical aspects of CCB’s in-
solvency in terms of its causes, the problems faced by Bulgaria’s bank system 
of Bulgaria and the decisions taken by the regulators.  
 
 
 1. Banking system and bank insolvency 
 
Banking systems are key components of all national economies and 
the global economy. Traditionally, they have a two-tier hierarchical structure 
under the supervision and control of a Central Bank. The primary objective of 
the Central Bank is “...to maintain price stability through ensuring the stability 
of the national currency and implementing monetary policy as provided for 
by…” (Art. 2 (1) of LBNB). Moreover, the Law on BNB provides that it 
“…shall regulate and supervise other banks’ activities in this country for the 
purpose of ensuring the stability of the banking system and protecting deposi-
tors’ interests.” (Art. 2(6) of LBNB) The regulatory function of the central 
banking institution is defined as “The Bulgarian National Bank shall: 1. de-
termine by an ordinance the minimum reserve requirements which banks shall 
be required to keep with the Bulgarian National Bank, the method of their 
calculation, as well as the terms and procedure for interest payments on them; 
2. establish by an ordinance other terms and requirements for the maintenance 
of the stability of the credit system.” (Art. 41 (1), items 1 and 2 of LBNB) The 
Governing Council of BNB has the authority to “grant, refuse to grant, and 
withdraw licenses of banks.” (Art. 16, item 15 of LBNB) Another important 
regulatory provision for the Governing Council of BNB is their power to take 
decisions as a resolution authority in the cases provided for in the Law on 
Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms. (Art. 
16, item 16 of LBNB).  
In many respects, the above brief overview of the structure of the 
banking system and its main regulatory powers confirm the willingness of the 
legislator to rank, subordinate, and designate all structural units of the banking 
system so as to ensure the stability of the system itself. BNB’s management 
structure provides for strict banking supervision by means a constant infor-
mation flow of disclosures, guidelines, regulations, measures and actions aim-
ing to maintain the stability of the banking system. However, as principal 
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constituent units of the banking system, credit institutions may be affected 
negatively by external (macroeconomic) factors, poor internal governance, or 
both. In such cases the whole banking system may be distressed when some 
of its structural units assume unjustified risks and accumulate a critical vol-
ume of "toxic assets" that trigger a "domino effect" within the system due to 
the interbank lending and borrowing of credit institutions.   
Such "intoxication" requires the application of a set of measures pro-
vided for by the Bank Bankruptcy Act, which would result in temporary or 
permanent de-licensing of the "toxic" credit institution and the appointment of 
a new management of financial conservators or trustees in bankruptcy. At this 
stage of its life-cycle, the banking institution has two alternatives: to be reha-
bilitated through a recovery plan and actions or to be declared in liquidation.2 
However, commercial banks are not legal entities with limited influence and 
importance in the business and financial sector of a national economy. They 
are also international payment system operators. They have thousands of de-
positors3, who trust them with their savings for safekeeping and profitable 
investment. Depositor's status is acquired by opening a deposit account4 with 
a TB. 
Bank insolvency can also affect the interests of the bank’s borrowers if 
the "early claim" clause of their loan agreements is activated. A bank can be 
declared insolvent in two situations:  
• If the total liabilities of the bank exceed its total assets. The excess 
is calculated using accounting methods and the book value of the assets and 
liabilities. When the bank is declared insolvent by decision of the court, a 
bankruptcy procedure may be initiated.  
• When the total liabilities of the bank do not exceed its total assets, 
but the bank does not have enough liquid assets to cover its current liabilities, 
the bank is declared illiquid. In such a case the bank faces the risk of snow-
balling withdrawals that exceed the time-lag of its asset operations. In such 
                                           
 2 For the purposes of our research the terms “credit institution” (CI) and 
“commercial bank” (CB) are used interchangeably. 
 3 For the purposes of our research the term “depositor” is used according to the 
definition in the LBDG, i.e.: “…a person who, pursuant to the statutory and contractual 
provisions applicable, has the right to receive the funds on the bank account or the credit 
balance ensuing from temporary positions as the result of usual banking transactions.” (§1, 
item 3 of the Additional Provisions of the LBDG) 
 4 For the purposes of our research the term “deposit” is used according to the 
definition in the LBDG, i.e. “”Deposit” shall be the kept on a bank account, irrespective of its 
type, opened in the name of one or more persons, or credit balance ensuing from temporary 
positions as the result of usual banking transactions, whereas the bank is obliged to repay 
such funds or balances to the depositors in pursuance of the statutory and contractual 
provisions applicable.” (§1, item 1 of the Additional Provisions of the LBDG)  
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situations the bank management usually requests a liquidity support from the 
CB and the CB may or may not provide the required funds. If the support re-
quest is not approved, the CB may designate the bank as a “toxic” unit of the 
banking system, withdraw its license until the appointed conservators estab-
lish its actual financial position in terms of assets, liabilities, property, and to 
capital. 
 For the purposes of this research the term bank insolvency shall be 
defined as the process of a bank’s governance (carried out by appointed con-
servators or trustees in bankruptcy) starting with the withdrawal of its license 
by a court-approved decision of the Governing Council of BNB under the 
provisions of Art. 13 (1) of LBB and the conditions provided for by Art. 36 
(2)5 of LCI, passing through the stage of operative control of its balance sheet 
items (receivables and payables) and estate and is terminated by a judgement 
of the bankruptcy court, where either the debts have been repaid, or the prop-
erty of the bankruptcy estate has been depleted (Art. 105 (1) of LBB), which 
entails the deletion of the bank from the Commercial Register. 
In the course of the research we assumed that the conservator is a spe-
cial and qualitatively new form of institutional bank manager (within a bank-
ruptcy proceedings) whose effective actions, timely decisions, and preventive 
initiatives of a judicial and regulatory nature directly lead to the protection of 
the patrimony of the insolvent bank whose redemption shall provide the funds 
for reimbursement to the BDIF.  
The banking system is built on strict financial reporting rules. “The 
aim of these reports is to implement a financial reporting framework in com-
pliance with the International Accounting Standards and the International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) adopted by the European Commis-
sion with Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 July 2002.6“ BNB implemented a mandatory standardized re-
porting framework in order to ensure comparability of the asset, liability, in-
come, and cash flow items in the statements of the supervised entities (com-
mercial banks). Moreover, the framework’s unified structure of balance sheet, 
income statement and cash flow statement items complies with the philosophy 
of the Basel regulatory standards and is a prerequisite for application of Basel 
II and the forthcoming BASEL III standards in response to the global finan-
cial crisis of 2008. The regulatory standards for balance sheet, income state-
ment and cash flow statement items of commercial banks are the basis for 
developing a methodology for solvency analysis and assessment.  
                                           
 5 The Bulgarian National Bank is obliged to withdraw the bank’s license due to 
insolvency, where the value of the assets of the bank is less than the value of its liabilities and 
the bank does not meet the conditions provided for in Art. 51, Para. 1 of the Law on the 
Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms.    
6 Вж. http://www.bnb.bg/BankSupervision/BSSDFinancialReports/index.htm 
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II. Reaction mechanisms in cases of bank insolvency, illiquidity, 
and bankruptcy 
 
Creditors (depositors) are accounted for in the asset part of the balance 
sheet because they provide the funds extended as loans to borrowers 
(Захариев & други, 2015). These two categories of bank clients have differ-
ent interests and receive different regulatory protection. The main difference 
in terms of regulatory protection is that depositors’ interests are protected by 
the provisions of the Law on Bank Deposit Guarantee and the Bulgarian De-
posit Insurance Fund (BDIF). In Bulgaria this guarantee is limited to BGN 
196 00. (Art. 4 of LBDG) of “depositor’s accounts with a bank.” The “Fund’s 
resources maybe used only for payments on deposits up to the amount guaran-
teed, in the cases where the Bulgarian National Bank has withdrawn the bank-
ing license granted to the commercial bank.” (Art. 23 of LBDG) Moreover, 
the provides that “Depositor’s claims in excess of the amount received from 
the Fund shall be settled from the bank’s property, pursuant to current legisla-
tions.” (Art. 23 (10) of LBDG). Bank insolvency can affect the interests of the 
bank’s borrowers as well where the "early claim" clause of their loan agree-
ments is activated. 
The research publications of (Hannan & Henweck, 1988), (Hainz, 
2005); (Lastra, Northern Rock, UK bank insolvency and cross-border bank 
insolvency, 2008); (Strobel, Bank insolvency risk and Z-score measures with 
unimodal returns, 2011) (Campbell, 2006)  propose some modern views about 
and globally-applicable policies for credit crisis management in cases of bank 
insolvency, including: 
• Liquidation of the “toxic unit” in the banking systems following 
the example of Lemon Brothers in the USA on 15 Sept. 2008 through filing 
for a voluntary bankruptcy at the competent regulatory body. Such liquida-
tion definitely has a “domino” effect on many other financial institutions fol-
lowing the rule “the larger the company, the grater global rippling impact.” 
(Johnson & Mamun, 2012); 
• Bailing out the institution having financial difficulties through 
nationalization and reorganization plan following the example of Northern 
Rock in the UK in 2007–2008 г. (Lastra R. , 2008) и and the Greek banks 
during the Greek debt crisis after 2010. (Vogiazas & Alexiou, 2013). 
• Liquidation of the “toxic unit” in the banking systems following 
the example of CCB, Bulgaria through a regulatory-induced insolvency 
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Liquidation of the “toxic element”
in the banking system through a
voluntary insolvency procedure 
Bailing out the institution having 
financial difficulties through 
nationalization and reorganization 
plan
Liquidation of the “toxic element”
in the banking system through an 
insolvency procedure
CB’s reaction policy 
options 





Figure 1. Policy options for management of bank insolvency 
 
The above three options have specific advantages and disadvantages, 
including in the context of the “too big to fail” (TBTF) doctrine. This doctrine 
was subject to scientific research long before the latest negative events in the 
21st century (Pettway, 1980); (Hannan & Henweck, 1988). A recent research 
conducted in 2017 by (Kazandzhieva-Yordanova, 2017) confirmed that the 
TBTF doctrine has certain adverse effects and requires “certain measures to 
restrict government intervention in cases of insolvency of major banks”, 
whereas “…in the EU such measures are adopted mostly for the supervision 
of system-significant banks, capital requirements, banks’ capacity to cover 
losses with internal reserves and guarantee deposits.” The author reviewd the 
evolution of Deposit Guarantee Schemes, analysed their effect for the TBTF 
doctrine and proved that the development of deposit insurance had a contra-
dictory effect for the TBTF doctrine. However, another recent survey con-
ducted in 2011 studied the relationship between loan portfolio structure and 
insolvency exposure. (Rahman A. A., 2011); (Tsai, 2010). A research on the 
economies in transition (Hainz, 2005) confirms the direct relation between 
bank bankruptcy and investments financed with loans. (Campbell, 2006) stud-
ied the relationship between bank insolvency and depositors’ behaviour and 
put forward some arguments in favour of the bailing-out policy (the second 
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 3. BNB’s behavior in the case of CCB’s insolvency  
 
On 06 Nov. 2014, pursuant to the Law on Credit Institutions and The 
Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, the Governing Council of BNB with-
drew the banking license of Corporate Commercial Bank AD, which was one 
of the system-significant Bulgarian banks. The withdrawal decision com-
prised four main points: 
First.  The BNB Governing Council revoked the license for conducting 
banking activities granted by the BNB Governor’s orders. 
Second. On the grounds of the Law on Bank Bankruptcy, the compe-
tent court of law was petitioned to open bankruptcy proceedings for the said 
bank. 
Third. On the grounds of the Law on Bank Bankruptcy, the Bulgarian 
Deposit Insurance Fund was notified of the petition filed to the competent 
court of law for opening bankruptcy proceedings for the said bank, so that 
preparatory actions can be initiated for the appointment of an assignee (trus-
tee) in bankruptcy. 
Fourth. On the grounds of the Law on Credit Institutions, until an as-
signee in bankruptcy was appointed, the conservators of Corporate Commer-
cial Bank AD were to continue to exercise their powers.  
I(n the motives to the decision BNB stated that “…By the BNB Gov-
erning Council’s Decision No. 73 of 20.06.2014, CCB was placed under spe-
cial supervision for risk of insolvency, for a period of three months, and con-
servators were appointed, the payment of all obligations of the bank was sus-
pended, the bank’s operations were limited as the bank was banned from con-
ducting all activities under its banking license, the members of its Manage-
ment and Supervisory Boards were dismissed, and the shareholders directly or 
indirectly holding over 10 percent of voting shares were divested of their vot-
ing rights.”  
A parallel review of CCB’s assets was assigned and was carried out 
jointly by three auditing teams. The review of assets was partial and primarily 
covered the loan portfolio and the investment portfolio. The review was de-
signed to assess the state and quality of 95.4 percent of KTB’s loan portfolio 
and 99.1 percent of its investment portfolio, and also to make a limited analy-
sis of the bank’s liabilities. The review established that important information 
was missing on the financial circumstances of a category of borrowers (loans 
totalling BGN 3.5 billion, which was 65% of the entire loan portfolio of BGN 
5.4 billion.) Significant indications of credit risk were found about the repay-
ment of credit exposures in that category of borrowers. The credit risk con-
centration was considered sufficient evidence for credit risk exposure exceed-
ing by far the regulatory limits.  
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The BNB Governing Council’s Decision of 31 July 2014 approved a 
Report on CCB’s current position, submitted by the bank’s conservators. The 
same decision instructed CCB’s conservators to sign additional contracts with 
the audit firms for a thorough assessment of CCB’s assets to be completed by 
20.10.2014. With a Decision of 16 September 2014, the BNB Governing 
Council extended through 20.11.2014 the term of CCB’s special supervision. 
The audit firms’ assessment was done based on the assets and bank guaran-
tees entered in the bank’s records as of 30.06.2014 while reflecting all signifi-
cant events until 30.09.2014 which affect the analysis.  
 
Balance-sheet item 
according to sample 
Value 
according to the 
bank’s registers 
as of 30.06.2014 
Value according 
to the bank’s 




based on the 
analysis and 
assessment 
 BGN mln. BGN mln. BGN mln. 
Loans granted to non-
financial institutions and 
other clients (loan 
portfolio) 5 301 5 335 -4 057 
Investments available for 
sale (investment portfolio) 380 376 -144 
Securities (investments) 
held for trading (trading 
portfolio) 11 9 0 
Other assets 353 141 -3 
Property owned by the 
bank 60 59 -18 
Investment in CB Victoria 5 5 0 
Total amount 6 109 5 925 -4 222 
Source: BNB 
 
The auditors’ findings and conclusions revealed a striking amount of 
impairment of CCB’s assets totaling BGN 4.222 bln., which was equal to 
5.14% of Bulgaria’s GDP in 2014.   
A parallel on-site inspection was carried out in KTB by a team of ex-
perts from the BNB Banking Supervision Department. The inspection was 
carried out in three stages with a scope and goals as follows:  
Stage One –finding out the completeness of credit files – object of re-
view during the last supervisory inspection (based on data as at 31.03.2013) 
and comparing with the content of the same as at 30.05.2014;  
Stage Two – assessment of the administration of credit files for loans 
extended after 31.03.2013, as well as credit deals outside the sample reviewed 
in the last supervisory inspection carried out based on data as at 31.03.2013, 
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but included in the sample of the three audit firms conducting the asset re-
view;   
Stage Three – tracing the cash flows related to the drawdown of funds 
on these loans and their servicing, the likely connectedness of borrowers from 
the bank’ loan portfolio, the origin of funds for the increase of the sharehold-
ers’ equity and the issue of other capital instruments included in the institu-
tion’s capital.  
The findings and conclusions from the inspection allow reaching a 
substantiated conclusion that the “bank’s controlling and management bodies 
applied vicious banking and business practices by submitting misrepresenting 
and misleading financial and supervisory reports.”  
Based on the financial and supervisory reports of CCB as of 
30.09.2014, submitted on 4.11.2014, the BNB Governing Council established 
that CCB’s own funds have a negative value of minus BGN 3.745 bln., and 
that the bank does not meet the capital requirements under Regulation (ЕU) 
No. 575/2013. The following ratios were reported by the bank: 
• Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio: -188.03 %; 
• Tier 1 capital ratio: -188.03 %; and  
• Capital Adequacy Ratio: -180.18 %.  
In parallel with CCB’s assets review notifications of cessions of re-
ceivables concluded between the bank’s customers, and declarations of inten-
tion to set off liabilities to the bank with receivables from it acquired under 
cession agreements, were received after the date of placing the bank under 
special supervision. The conservators informed that as of 31.10.2014, the re-
ceivables transferred under cession agreements amounted to BGN 1,183,714 
thousand in total, and the declarations of intention for setoffs amounted to 
BGN 779,055 thousand. Even if all cession and setoff notifications had been 
reflected in the bank’s accounting books, the financial result of CCB as of 
30.09.2014 would have improved by only BGN 161,468 thousand owing to 
impairments that would be eliminated (respectively reversed) as a result of 
liabilities to the bank that have been fully or partially repaid under the decla-
rations of intention for setoffs of the above-mentioned amount. As a result, 
CCB’s own funds remained a negative value. Therefore, according to the Law 
on Credit Institutions, the Bulgarian National Bank had to start a procedure 
for withdrawal of the bank’s license due to insolvency, where it has found that 
the amount of the bank’s own funds is negative. 
 
*      *     * 
Bank managers must have a detailed and in-depth knowledge of 
bank lending technology and the effects of the various factors on bank loans 
in order generate profits and avoid losses. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian finan-
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cial system reported a serious turmoil in 2014 and 2015, which was caused 
stemming by the special supervision of one of the leading system banks - 
Corporate Commercial Bank. On 23 Sept. 2015 the appointed trustees in 
bankruptcy of the bank published a report of 575 pages with a detailed de-
scription of the breaches of lending principles and capital management com-
mitted by CCB. The apparent violation of these principles had turned a seem-
ingly well-functioning and growing CB into a blatant example of non-






Campbell, A. (2006). Bank insolvency and the interests of creditors. Journal 
of Banking regulation, 7(1-2), 133-144. 
Hainz, C. (2005). Effects of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in 
transition economies. Economics of Transition, 3(2), 261-286. 
Hannan, T. H., & Henweck, G. A. (1988, May). Bank insolvency risk and the 
market for large certificates of deposit. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 20(2), 203-211. 
Johnson, M., & Mamun, A. (2012). The Failure of Lehmon Brothers and its 
impact on other finajncial institutions. Applied Financial Economics, 
375-385. 
Lastra, R. (2008). Northern Rock, UK Bank Insolvency and Cross-border 
Bank Insolvency. Journal of Banking Regulation, 165-186. 
Lastra, R. M. (2008). Northern Rock, UK bank insolvency and cross-border 
bank insolvency. Journal of Banking Regulation, 9(3), 165-186. 
Strobel, F. (2011). Bank insolvency risk and Z-score measures with unimodal 
returns. Applied Economics Letters, 18(17), 1683-1685. 
doi:10.1080/13504851 
Vogiazas, S., & Alexiou, C. (2013). Liquidity and the business cycle: 
empirical evidence from the Greek banking sector. Economic Annals, 
109-120. 
Zahariev, А. et al. (2015). Capital Management (Theory and Practice). V. 
Tarnovo: FABER. 
 
 ECONOMIC ARCHIVE 





Vera Pirimova,  Petar Peshev,  
Comparative Advantages and Competitiveness of Bulgarian Exports     / 3 
 
Petya Vasileva  
Current Challenges to the Offshore Business     / 33 
 
Cornelia A. Philipova  
Unemployment Benefits in Bulgaria and Their Potential for Prevention  
of Poverty     / 43 
 
Kristi Marinova  
Bank Insolvency – Regulatory Challenges and Empirical Evidence     / 58 
 
Tamari Poladashvili  
Students’ Perspective Towards to Bologna Process and Employability  












Prof. Andrey Zahariev, PhD – editor-in-chief 
Prof. Georgi Ivanov, PhD – Deputy Editor  
Prof. Yordan Vasilev, PhD 
Assoc. Prof. Iskra Panteleeva, PhD 
Assoc. Prof. Stoyan Prodanov, PhD  
Assoc. Prof. Plamen Yordanov, PhD 
Assoc. Prof. Rumen Lazarov, PhD  
Assoc. Prof. Ventsislav Vassilev, PhD 
Assoc. Prof. Anatoliy Asenov, PhD 
Assoc. Prof. Presiana Nenkova, PhD 
 
INTERNATIONAL BOARD: 
Prof. Mihail A. Eskindarov, DSc (Econ) – Rector of Financial University under the Government 
of the Russian Federation – Federal State Educational Institution for Vocational Education, 
Doctor Honoris Causa of D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics – Svishtov 
Prof. LesterLloyd-Reason – Director of International Business Centre at Lord Ashcroft 
International Business School in Cambridge, Great Britain 
Prof. Ken O’Neil – Chair of the Faculty of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, Department of 
Marketing, Entrepreneurship and Strategies at the University of Ulster, North Ireland 
Prof. Richard Thorpe – Business School at Leeds University, Professor of Management 
Development, Deputy Director of the Keyworth Institute, Leeds, Great Britain 
Prof. Andrey Krisovatiy, DSc (Econ) – Ternopil National Economic University, Doctor Honoris 
Causa of D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics – Svishtov 
Prof. Grigore Belostechnik, DSc (Econ) – Rector of Moldovan Academy of Economic Studies, 
Doctor Honoris Causa of D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics – Svishtov  
Prof. Yon Kukuy, DSc (Econ) – President of the Senate of Valahia University, the town of 
Targovishte, Romania, Doctor Honoris Causa of D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics – Svishtov  
Prof. Mihail Zveryakov, DSc (Econ) – Rector of Odessa State Economic University, Doctor 
Honoris Causa of D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics – Svishtov 
Prof. Olena Nepochatenko, DSc (Econ) – Rector of Uman National University of Horticulture 
(Ukraine) 
Prof. Dmytro Lukianenko, DSc (Econ) – First Prorector on Research-pedagogical and Research 
Work of Kyiv National Economic University named after Vadym Hetman (Ukraine) 
 
Anka Taneva – copyreader  
Elka Uzunova – Senior lecturer in English – coordinator of the translation team 
Daniela Stoilova – Senior lecturer in English – translation into English 
Rumyana Deneva – Senior lecturer in English – translation into English 
Margarita Mihaylov – Senior lecturer in English – translation into English 
Ivanka Borisova – Senior lecturer in English – translation into English 
Ventsislav Dikov – Senior lecturer in English – copyreader 
 
Editorial address: 
2, Emanuil Chakarov street, Svishtov 5250 
Prof. Andrey Zahariev, PhD – editor-in-chief 
 (++359) 889 882 298 
Deyana Vesselinova – Technical Secretary  
 (++359) 631 66 309, е-mail: nsarhiv@uni-svishtov.bg 
Albena Aleksandrova – computer graphic design 
 (++359) 882 552 516, е-mail: a.aleksandrova@uni-svishtov.bg 
Blagovesta Borisova – computer graphic design 
 (++359) 882 552 516, е-mail: b.borisova@uni-svishtov.bg 
© Academic publishing house “Tsenov” – Svishtov 
© D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics – Svishtov 


